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Introduction 
Debates on how business organization has moved beyond Chandler’s vertically 
integrated multi-divisional firm (Chandler, 1977) have greatly benefited from the concept 
of “modularity” (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000). We know that progress in the division 
of labor in design (technical modularity) has created opportunities for vertical 
specialization in project execution, enabling firms to disintegrate the value chain as well 
as to disperse it geographically. Increasingly this process has taken on a global 
dimension, giving rise first to offshore assembly in a wide range of industries (both 
traditional ones like garments and innovative ones like semiconductors), and later on to 
outsourcing to global contract manufacturers
1. More recently, modular design has also 
provided ample opportunities for vertical specialization in the production of knowledge-
intensive services, such as software, information services, engineering and R&D
2. 
However, as so often happens in the history of social sciences, the success of an idea 
may sometimes lead to exaggerated claims that forget that even the best theories have 
limits. There is a tendency in the “modularity” literature to generalize empirical 
observations that are context-specific and to confound them with prescription as well as 
prediction. In this view, modularity becomes an over-arching business model that 
changes the way firms do business and how they organize to develop their products, 
processes and organization. Some proponents even claim to have discovered “a new 
American model of industrial organization” (Sturgeon, 2002). It is argued that modularity 
gives rise to a set of market-supporting institutions, notably stable interface standards and 
design rules, enabling firms to pursue focused strategies that rely heavily on outsourcing 
across the value chain. A resurgence of market forces that modularity facilitates will thus 
make the “Visible Hand” of large corporations invisible (Langlois, 2003). In short, 
modularity requires less coordination through corporate management. 
In response to such strong claims of pervasive modularity, an alternative set of 
theories has emerged that center on the dynamics of modularity (Chesbrough, 2003b), 
“system integration” (Pavitt, 2003 a and b; Prencipe, Davies and Hobday, 2003), “open 
innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003a), and “iterated co-design” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004). 
                                                           
1 On garments, see Gereffi (1994); on semiconductors, see  Ernst (1983); and on outsourcing, see Ernst and 
O’Connor (1992), Hobday (1995), Luethje (2002), Sturgeon (2002), and Ernst (2004a). 
2 For instance,  Arora, Gambardella and Rullani, 1998; Ernst, 2002a and 2004b. 
  1This revisionist literature argues that current theories of modularity “predict too much” 
(Chesbrough 2003b: 193), and that, by confounding technical and market modularity, 
these theories exaggerate the empirical significance of the latter (Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2004). As modularity theories pay insufficient attention to the dynamics of technical 
advances, they fail to explore the complex forces and constraints that shape processes of 
modularization, such as the increase of complexity with each transition to a new 
architecture, and the critical role of systems integration. Most importantly, if  codification 
does not reduce complexity (which it fails to do when technologies keep changing fast 
and unpredictably), then the division of inter-firm collaboration will remain constrained, 
and requires more (not less) coordination through corporate management (Brusoni, 
Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001; Pavitt, 2003a and 2003b; Brusoni, 2003; Ernst, 2004b; and 
Tokumaru, 2004). In short, there are fundamental limits to modularity.  
In this paper, I assess what we know about the limits to modularity and their impact on 
firm organization and industry structure. I focus on evidence from chip design, drawing 
on interviews during 2002 and 2003 with a sample of  60 companies and 15 research 
institutions that are involved in chip design in the US, Taiwan, Korea, China and 
Malaysia
3. I first summarize “stylized” propositions of the modularity literature that are 
well-established, as well as predictions that are controversial. In part 2, I review 
important findings of the revisionist literature. In the rest of the paper, I describe three 
fundamental limits to modularity and relevant management responses. Part 3 highlights 
important differences in the coordination requirements of  “project execution” (to design 
and produce an artefact, e.g. a chip) and of “technology development” (to produce the 
underlying knowledge bases). Part 4 documents constraints to interface standardization in 
the semiconductor industry. Part 5  examines the slow-down of innovation that may 
result from too strict an adherence to market modularity. Finally, part 6 examines the 
difficulties that management faces when it attempts to respond to the limits to modularity 
in chip design. 
 
1. The Modularity Literature  - Propositions and Predictions  
  The modularity literature has made an important contribution to the study of technical 
change and economic institutions. It demonstrates that progress in the division of labor in 
design (technical modularity) has created new opportunities for the organization of firms 
beyond vertical integration, and that this may transform industry structure and markets. 
The starting-point is technical change - “(m)odularity is a particular design structure, in 
which parameters and tasks are interdependent within units (modules) and independent 
across them.” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000: 88). But the main concern is with implications 
for business organization and markets. Modularity thus is defined broadly to encompass 
                                                           
3 The sample includes ten strategic groups of firms (both global and regional players) that participate in 
global design networks (GDNs): system companies; integrated device manufacturers (IDMs); providers of 
electronic manufacturing services (EMSs) and design services (the so-called ODMs, or “original-design-
manufacturers); “fabless” chip design houses; “chipless” licensors of “silicon intellectual properties” 
(SIPs); chip contract manufacturers (“foundries”); vendors of electronic design automation (EDA) tools; 
chip packaging and testing companies; and design implementation service providers; and institutes and 
universities (both private and public). In China, the sample includes state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
collective enterprises, and private technology firms. 
  2all  “techniques for dividing effort and knowledge …(that)… are fundamental to the 
creation of highly complex manmade things.” (ibid: 5). 
  What precisely does this literature tell us about the link between technical modularity 
and the organization of firms and markets? It is of course impossible to do justice to the 
many extremely insightful findings of a still relatively young and thriving body of 
literature. For our purposes, I suggest to focus on three ‘stylized’ propositions that are 
well established through both theoretical and empirical work, and on two predictions that 
are controversial. 
  1.2. Propositions  
The first proposition focuses on the convergence of technical and organizational 
modularity. It is argued that the architecture of a complex artefact corresponds with the 
organizational structure of the firm producing that artefact. The computer industry is 
frequently cited as an important breeding ground for this new industrial organization 
model (e.g., Langlois, 1992; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Until the early 1980s, IBM 
personified ‘vertical integration’ within a multi-divisional firm: almost all ingredients 
necessary to design, produce and commercialize computers remained internal to the firm. 
This was true for semiconductors, hardware, operating systems, application software, and 
sales and distribution. Since then, modular design, based on standard interchangeable 
components as well as the widely shared Wintel architecture, has rapidly eroded the 
economic rational for vertical integration. This, it is argued, has made vertical 
specialization (“organizational modularity”) the industry’s defining characteristic. 
A second proposition argues that organizational modularity is made possible by a 
combination of two developments: the codification of knowledge, enabled by the rapid 
diffusion of cheaper and more powerful information and communication technologies 
(ICT) (Sichel, 1997; Flamm, 1999); and market-led standardization (through technical 
standards and design rules) of the interfaces between organizationally separate stages of 
production. From a machine to automate transaction processing, the focus of ICT-enabled 
information management has shifted to the extraction of value from information 
resources, and then further to the establishment of Internet-enabled flexible information 
infrastructures that support not only information exchange among dispersed network 
nodes (e.g., Arora, Gambardella and Rullani, 1997), but also the sharing, utilization, and 
creation of knowledge among multiple network participants at remote locations 
(Jørgensen and Kogstie, 2000; Foray and Steinmueller, 2001). 
A third proposition  highlights implications for competitive strategies. It is argued that 
codification, together with shared interface standards and design rules reduces the 
“volume of information”, and hence the amount of knowledge sharing, that is required 
for inter-firm coordination. This makes it possible to transform products into fully 
“modular” or decomposable building-blocks, enabling firms to pursue focused strategies 
that rely heavily on outsourcing across the value chain. A computer company can now 
focus on those activities (‘core competencies’) that generate the highest margins and 
which are critical for sustaining the company’s competitive advantage. In turn, the 
company outsources those low-margin activities in which it does not have a strategic 
advantage (e.g., Ernst, 2002b). While outsourcing initially was focused on 
manufacturing, it now extends to all stages of the value chain, including research and 
new product development (Chesbrough, 2003a; Ernst, 2003 and  2004b). 
  3In short, the afore-mentioned three propositions of the modularity literature explore 
how progress in design methodology (“technical modularity”) has created new 
opportunities for vertical specialization (“organizational modularity) in project execution, 
enabling firms to disintegrate the value chain as well as to disperse it across firm 
boundaries and geographic borders. These propositions have been corroborated by the 
experience since the 1980s of a rapid expansion of global outsourcing. 
1.1.Predictions 
However, the modularity literature moves into murky waters, when it attempts to 
generalize empirical observations that are context-specific, and when it ventures to 
provide prediction as well as prescription about the evolution of technology and industry 
structure. For instance,  much of the current modularity literature shares the assumption 
(at least implicitly) that every technology will proceed  from a less modular, more 
integrated state towards a more modular state (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000). In this 
view, modularity becomes the stable end state of industry evolution, and this is claimed 
to be true across industries and technologies.  
A related equally strong prediction addresses the evolution of industry structure. It is 
argued that technical modularity leads to a resurgence of market forces, and that this will 
make the “Visible Hand” of large corporations invisible (Langlois, 2003). In this view, 
technical modularity is expected to lead to a new type of division of labor - a 
proliferation of modules produced by specialized firms using general-purpose tools (both 
machinery and software). As the market is the primary driver of this decentralization of 
economic transactions, less coordination is required through corporate management. At 
the same time, this will also erode entry barriers, and hence will undermine existing 
oligopolistic market structures. Two role models are mentioned in the literature: US-
based global providers of electronic manufacturing services (EMS) which for Sturgeon 
(2002) represent a “new American model of industrial organization”; and Silicon Valley-
style innovative start-up companies that focus on high-margin market segments, attract 
ample venture capital funding, and hence grow rapidly beyond their initial small size 
(e.g., Arora, Gambardella and Rullani, 1997). 
 
2. The Revisionist Literature 
However, empirical research on a variety of industries (both highly innovative and 
traditional ones)
4 has raised important questions to what degree the afore-mentioned 
predictions can be sustained. This has given rise to an alternative set of theories that 
center on the dynamics of modularity (Chesbrough, 2003b), “system integration” (Pavitt, 
2003a, and Davies, 2003), “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003a), and “iterated co-
design” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004). This revisionist literature highlights three specific 
weaknesses of current theories of modularity: they confound technical with market 
modularity; they exaggerate the empirical significance of market modularity; and they 
fail to explore the dynamics of modularization. These weaknesses need to be addressed to 
capture the complex forces and constraints that link technical modularity with changes in 
organization and market structure. 
                                                           
4 Studies of highly innovative sectors include aero-engines (Prencipe, 1997), telecommunications 
infrastructure (Davies, 1997), hard disk drives (Chesbrough, 2003b), and chip design (Tokumaru, 2004 and 
Ernst, 2004b). Studies of traditional sectors cover chemical engineering (Brusoni, 2003), oil exploration 
(Acha, 2002), automotives (Takeishi and Fujimoto, 2003) and tyres (Acha and Brusoni, 2002). 
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2.1. Technical versus market modularity  
Chesbrough’s distinction between technical and market modularity (2003b) highlights 
an important weakness of the modularity literature: a failure to distinguish between 
technical modularity and related changes in institutions, i.e. firm organization and 
markets. “Market modularity” is used as a shorthand for the institutional, informational 
and cognitive conditions that “enable markets to take over…( at least parts of, DE) … the 
coordination tasks of innovation.” (ibid. : 178) Both technical and market modularity 
may go hand in hand in some cases, but they need not do so. Technical modularity is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for market modularity. Chesbrough highlights four 
criteria that must be met for both types of modularity to converge: knowledge diffusion, 
shared language, verification, and supplier base. 
  Market modularity implies that, instead of a vertically integrated firm (e.g., IBM), 
multiple specialized suppliers contribute components (both hardware and software) that 
constitute a specific architecture. All of these firms thus need to be able to share the 
knowledge of how the components interact within a particular design architecture
5. This 
implies that the knowledge of how to implement technical modularity through 
adjustments in organization and management procedures, must now be diffused outside 
the firm (e.g., through open standards and production networks). Second, for network 
participants to be able to clearly communicate their requirements, there must be a shared 
language that can be used to specify unambiguously the features and functions of 
components. In other words, network participants must agree on a standard language that 
enables them to share their diverse concepts and codes. 
Third, of particular importance is the verification criterion: tools and equipment must 
exist to verify that the required attributes of components have been met. In chip design, 
for instance verification has become a critical bottleneck that constrains market 
modularity
6. Finally, while technical modularity facilitates the development of complex 
networks for manufacturing and design, there is no guarantee that technical and market 
modularity will converge. For this to happen, a capable and broad-based supplier base 
must exist  that allows the “flagship” of the resultant networks (Ernst, 2002b) to switch 
suppliers. 
  Using these four criteria can help to determine for a particular industry whether 
modular design (“technical modularity”) has been transformed into market modularity. 
Take the semiconductor industry where shared design rules have initially helped to 
separate design from fabrication, juxtaposing fabless design houses and silicon foundries 
in a modular market structure. However, the simultaneous transition to submicron 
                                                           
5 Computer designers use the term “architecture” to refer to “the partitioning of the … (computer) … 
system into components of a given scope and related to each other functionally and physically through 
given interfaces. From a given architecture flows the design of components’ functions and how they relate 
to each other…” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 18). These authors compare a system architecture with a 
geographic map, where the components of the system are the countries’ territories and the interfaces 
between components are the countries’ borders (ibid.:19). 
6 With growing design complexity, it becomes necessary to verify early and frequently whether the SoC 
design can be produced at sufficiently high yield, and whether it will do what it is expected to do. Today, 
60 to 70% of SoC hardware design time goes into verification, leaving only 30 to 40% for the actual device 
development. This “verification crisis” obviously constrains considerably the productivity of design. “ 
(Ernst, 2004b: p.11 WP) 
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increased complexity, with the result that the first three of the above four criteria for 
market modularity are no longer met (Ernst, 2004b): intractable constraints to interface 
standardization obstruct knowledge diffusion and the use of  a shared language  to 
specify unambiguously design rules and the features and functions of components. At the 
same time, the “verification bottleneck” has been spiraling out of control. 
In short, we need empirical research to identify precisely “…when and why technical 
modularity leads (or does not lead) to modularity in the market.” (Chesbrough 2003b: 
194).  
 
2.2.  Limited empirical significance of market modularity 
On the empirical significance, the electronics industry is often taken as the pre-
eminent example of market modularity. Yet, as Sabel and Zeitlin (2004: 10) rightly 
emphasize: “arm’s-length coordination among specialists based on standard technical 
interfaces… (i.e. “market modularity”, DE)  is less common than is often claimed”
7. For 
instance, in 2002, the share of U.S. based contract manufacturers (the providers of 
electronic manufacturing services, or EMS) in worldwide production of electronics 
hardware was estimated to be around 16%
8. 
But even more important are fundamental changes in the organization of electronic 
contract manufacturing. Ernst (2004c) highlights serious limitations to the US model of 
contract manufacturing. For instance, global contract manufacturing is a highly volatile 
industry. While powerful forces push for outsourcing, this process is by no means 
irreversible. Major global brand leaders (the so-called original-equipment manufacturers, 
OEMs) retain substantial internal manufacturing operations; they are continuously 
evaluating the merits of manufacturing products or providing services internally versus 
the advantages of outsourcing (e.g., Bengtsson and Berggren, 2002). Second, global EMS 
are now in a much weaker bargaining position than OEMs, whose number has been 
reduced by the current downturn and who are now much more demanding (e.g., Benson-
Armer et al, 2004).  
Furthermore, serious conflicts of interest have emerged between OEMs, who are 
looking for flexibility, and EMS, who are looking for predictability and scale. For 
instance, OEMs focus on early market penetration and rapid growth of market share to 
sustain comfortable margins. OEMs thus need flexibility in outsourcing arrangements 
that allows them to divert resources at short notice to a given product as it becomes a hit. 
This sharply contrasts with the situation of EMS: with razor-thin margins, they need to 
focus ruthlessly on cost cutting. EMS need predictability: “they want to make 
commitments in advance to reap benefits like big-lot purchases and decreased overtime.” 
(Lakenan et al , 2001, p.10). 
These conflicting interests complicate the coordination of these “modular” production 
networks. They also require substantial changes in the organization of both OEMs and 
EMS, as well as an alignment of incentives through contract terms and agreements. The 
                                                           
7 The limited empirical significance of  market modularity has also been documented by research on 
complex mechanical assembly industries (such as automobiles, aircraft , construction and agricultural 
machinery) and chemical engineering (see sources quoted in Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004 and in Prencipe et al, 
2004). 
8 Ernst, 2004a, quoting data provided by Eric Miscoll, CEO, Technology Forecasters, Inc, April 15, 2002.  
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more difficult it is to coordinate them. 
In addition, the proponents of modularity have neglected a powerful trend towards 
reintegration of manufacturing and design that appears to counter earlier modularization 
processes. Let us first look at manufacturing. Since the turn of the century, two different 
business model compete for success in the global electronics contract manufacturing 
industry - EMS (= electronic manufacturing services) and ODM (= original design 
manufacturing)
9. The two main strengths of EMS companies are process-related, with a 
focus on scale and global presence and “integrated solutions”. But EMS are typically 
weak in product-specific knowledge and design capabilities, which keeps their profit 
margins low. Contrast this with the ODM business model which provides reasonable 
margins, but requires good design capabilities. More specifically, ODM companies must 
be able to choose the appropriate hardware platforms, and they must be able to integrate 
software and applications of growing complexity, while meeting a diverse array of 
standard protocols. Equally  important are short design cycles and a capacity for flexible 
response. This must be combined with sufficient scale, sophisticated component sourcing 
and a strong supply chain in low-cost Asia. 
Both EMS and ODM have tried to overcome their respective disadvantages, giving 
rise to an at least partial convergence of EMS and ODM business models. No EMS can 
survive without covering ODM services, and vice versa. Economies of scale and scope 
determine success in this business, which drives the growth of these firms, primarily 
through mergers and acquisitions. As EMS grow and expand globally, system integration 
capabilities become their most important differentiating factor.  
In short, it is fair to argue that “market modularity”, defined as reliance on arms’-
length transactions mediated by market forces, has provided new opportunities for global 
brand leaders to pursue selective strategies of vertical specialization. It would however be 
misleading to claim that “market modularity” dominates electronics manufacturing.  
That claim can also no longer be made for chip design. During the initial euphoria of 
the late 1990s, there were widespread expectations that technical modularity, i.e. the 
reuse of design knowledge through modular design, combined with the transition to 
system-on-chip (SoC) design, would naturally lead to organizational and market 
modularity. This perception is mirrored in the claim by Linden and Somaya (1993: 545) 
that “we observe a burgeoning market for licensed DMs (= design modules, or SIPs in 
industry parlance, DE)”. In the conclusions of this article, the authors are struggling to 
support this claim. Linden and Somaya (2003: 571) state that “integrated modes currently 
enjoy the upper hand in SoC, primarily due to the initial distribution of industry assets 
and the lack of supporting licensing institutions at the dawn of the SoC era.”  They argue 
however that the balance may shift over time towards open market SIP licensing. 
Yet, this prediction is not supported by empirical evidence. There are three external 
sources of SIPs for SoC design teams: (1) in-house SIP libraries that compile building 
blocks from previous designs; (2) other in-house design teams working in parallel with 
                                                           
9 The term “EMS” is used for companies that provide manufacturing (PCB assembly and box assembly) 
and order fulfillment services, across a wide range of product markets, to global system/brand name 
companies (the so-called OEM customers). The term “ODM” on the other hand describes companies that 
provide product design, manufacturing and distribution logistics for OEM customers with a relatively 
narrow product focus. 
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vendors are the least important source. Instead, the exchange of SIPs takes place 
primarily  within global system companies and flagship-dominated global design 
networks (GDNs) (e.g., Martin, 2003:11; Goering, 2002). The global market for SIPs has 
remained relatively small (Ernst, 2004b, figure 6, The Global Market for SIPs). It 
consists primarily of a few “star” SIPs (for MPUs, DSPs, memories and analog design 
blocks), dominated by a handful of specialized global suppliers like ARM, MIPS, 
Rambus, and DSP Group.  
In short, market modularity has not come to dominate chip design. In contrast to 
predictions of a convergence of technical and market modularity in that sector, 
organizational integration appears to gain in importance, albeit in novel hybrid forms that 
differ from Chandler’s vertically integrated firm. Ernst and Martin (2004) document that, 
propelled by increasing complexity in process and design technology, a shift is under 
way in market power to those system companies and integrated device manufacturers 
(IDMs) that own system knowledge, SIPs, as well as advanced process development 
skills. On the other hand, favorites of the “modularity” literature, such as foundries, fab-
less design houses, chip-less SIP suppliers and EDA tool providers are facing new and 
very demanding challenges to their established business models. 
All of this indicates that the maturity of a technology may be a necessary condition for 
the convergence of technical and market modularity. This brings us to the dynamic aspect 
of the modularity story. 
 
2.3.  Dynamics of modularization 
Current modularity theories pay insufficient attention to the dynamics of technical 
advances, and hence fail to explore the complex forces and constraints that shape 
processes of modularization. Of particular importance are cognitive limits to modularity 
that emerge with each transition from a well-established (“mature”) to a new (“fluid”) 
design architecture. Proponents of modularity have left unexplored what happens when 
component and architectural design, as well as fabrication technologies keep changing 
fast and unpredictably, and how that affects the convergence of technical and market 
modularity. 
Take again chip design (Ernst, 2004b). Since the mid-1990s, intensifying pressures to 
improve design productivity, combined with increasingly demanding performance 
requirements for electronic systems (lighter, thinner, shorter, smaller, faster, multi-
functional, less power-consuming, and cheaper) have produced an upheaval in chip 
design methodology
10. Under the label of “system-on-chip“ (SoC) design, systematic 
attempts have been made to enhance design methodology by combining  “modular 
design” and “design automation” with attempts to move design from the individual 
component on a printed circuit board closer to “system-level integration” on a chip 
(Chang et al, 1999 and Martin. and H. Chang, eds., 2003). Fed by a massive inflow of 
abundant venture capital during the “New Economy” boom, which has encouraged 
                                                           
10 “Design methodology” is the sequence of steps by which a design process will reliably produce a design 
“as close as possible” to the design target, while maintaining feasibility with respect to constraints. All 
known design methodologies combine (1) the enforcement of system specification and constraints via top-
down planning and search, with (2) a bottom-up propagation of constraints that stem from physical laws, 
limits of design and manufacturing technology, and system cost limits. 
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and fabrication.  
  Best known is the symbiotic relationship between the two main carriers of modularity: 
“fabless” design houses that outsource chip fabrication, and specialized suppliers of 
contract fabrication services, the so-called “silicon foundries”. Less well known, but 
equally important are a diverse group of specialized providers of complementary 
services, such as tools for electronic design automation (EDA), verification, testing, and 
the development of embedded software. It is this de-coupling of design and fabrication 
and its fragmentation into diverse specialized suppliers that gave rise to the afore-
mentioned predictions of a convergence of technical and market modularity. 
  Note however that Macher, Mowery and Simcoe (2002) emphasize the persistent 
tension between vertical specialization and re-integration. This argument is supported by 
more recent research. In fact, current transformations appear to move away from market 
modularity in the opposite direction to more integrated, albeit new hybrid forms of 
industrial organization (Ernst and Martin, 2004). The earlier de-coupling of design and 
manufacturing is now being reversed by the increase in cognitive complexity (both on the 
chip/“silicon” and on the “system”) that results from advanced process geometry and 
progress in SoC design. This constrains the division of inter-firm collaboration within 
global design networks, and requires more (not less) coordination through corporate 
management. Large global corporations (the network flagships) are required as 
“knowledge integrators” to coordinate multiple interfaces between specialized bodies of 
knowledge within global design networks that have evolved as a result of technical 
modularity. 
Chesbrough’s dynamic theory of modularity provides a useful framework for 
analyzing how each transition to a new  architecture affects the process of modularization 
(Chesbrough,. 2003b; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). Chesbrough argues that the 
evolution of technology is cyclical, moving from “interdependent” to “modular” design 
architectures and back to “interdependent” ones, and that this technology cycle 
conditions the choice of organization and strategy. This reflects fundamental “limits to 
modularity” that are most prominent at the early stages of the development of a new 
technology. It is worthwhile to quote in detail this proposition: “When technologies are 
interdependent,  internal organization can better sort out these complex technical 
interactions than market-mediated transacting, due to the lower coordination costs of 
internal organization….This internal advantage goes away when technologies’ 
interrelationships become better understood…. (T)he incentives available within the 
market… (now) elicit greater innovation, and spread the costs of innovation across a 
wider market, relative to internal organization. At some later time, though, once these 
well-understood, modular technologies hit their performance limits, an interdependent 
technology phase arises anew.” (Chesbrough 2003b: 184-85). 
Chesbrough’s model distinguishes three stages: interdependent architecture 1 (I1), 
modular architecture 1(M1), and interdependent architecture 2 (I2). Technological 
interdependence characterizes any new technology. During stage I1, “the requisite 
information of how the different elements function together is not well defined, and 
interactions between elements are poorly understood….. In this early stage of technology 
evolution, managerial coordination, rather than markets, provides the most effective 
  9mechanisms to coordinate the relationship between elements of the system.” 
(Chesbrough, 2003b: 176). 
With growing maturity of the technology, modularization becomes possible, leading to 
stage M1. Engineers can now use the twin tools of analysis and synthesis to reduce 
significantly the complexity of the technology interfaces (Simon, 1962; von Hippel 1990; 
Kogut and Zander, 1993; Henderson and Clark, 1990). When benefits from established 
modular architecture are decreasing, the search for a new design architecture will lead to 
a new stage I2. At each stage, firms pursue different types of learning: learning-by-doing 
is required during I1, while learning-before-doing (Pisano, 1996) becomes possible 
during M1. The transition to I2 requires re-learning and a return to learning-by-doing. 
Chesbrough (2003b) uses  the development of heads, one of the key components of a 
hard disk drive, to demonstrate the dynamic cyclical evolution of modularity. He shows 
that, with each transition to a new generation of head technology, integrated modes of 
organization have regained advantages over more modular modes of organization - at 
least for a certain period of time. With the transition from iron-oxide to thin-film heads, 
“…(t)he integrated head manufacturers (i.e. the firms that made drives, as well as heads) 
were able to adopt the thin film heads years ahead of the merchant suppliers, precisely 
because they could employ internal administrative means to coordinate the 
interdependencies between the heads and the drive design.” (Chesbrough 2003b: 183). 
  A similar shift occurred  with the development of a recording head technology, called 
magneto-resistive (MR) heads. Extreme interdependence is the hallmark of this complex 
technology - “the design of the disks, actuator mechanisms, and read-write channels 
depended upon the design of the head - and vice versa.” (Chesbrough 2003b: 183). 
Again, integrated manufacturers who made their own heads such as IBM, Hitachi and 
Fujitsu, found it easier to sort out these interdependencies, and figure out solutions to 
these problems. Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001) demonstrate that non-integrated disk 
drive companies like Western Digital and Maxtor in the US, and NEC and Toshiba in 
Japan, found themselves in a “modularity trap” as they lacked the internal systems 
integration capabilities to cope with the interdependencies of MR heads. 
This pattern also holds for the example of chip design that I have introduced at the 
beginning of this section. As both design and fabrication technologies keep changing fast 
and unpredictably, the resultant increase in the cognitive and organizational complexity 
of chip design has produced an extreme degree of interdependence. Consequently, for 
each SoC design project, global design networks are constructed around project leaders 
(the network flagships) with systems integration capabilities strong enough to coordinate 
multiple design interfaces. These knowledge integrators are needed to coordinate 
multiple interfaces between fabless design houses and foundries, as well as with a diverse 
group of specialized providers of complementary services, such as tools for electronic 
design automation (EDA), verification, testing, and the development of embedded 
software (ESW). 
Of course, pure modularity and pure technological interdependence are extreme 
boundary conditions (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001) - most products and technologies exist 
somewhere along a continuum between these extremes. But these concepts are useful for 
examining the arduous process of advancing to a new, and better architecture in an 
industry characterized by significant modularity. Chesbrough’s dynamic theory of 
modularity  demonstrates that, if a firm fails to adjust its organization and innovation 
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“modularity trap.” In other words, if a firm focuses too much on developing products 
within given interface standards, this may erode the firm’s system integration 
capabilities. A “modularity trap” exists, when flagships fail to retain those system 
integration capabilities that are necessary to incorporate new (interdependent) component 
technologies effectively into their systems (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). 
In short, a dynamic perspective of modularization processes shows that almost every 
technology gives rise to a “modularity trap” at some stage in its evolution. This is so 
because attempts to advance beyond the current architecture reintroduce “the complexity 
at the systems level that modularity was intended to manage.” (Chesbrough 2003b:190). 
It is thus difficult to sustain the assumption, implicit in much of the modularity literature, 
that modularity is the stable end state of industry evolution, and that this is true across 
industries and technologies (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). While modular design has acted 
as a powerful catalyst for changes in business organization and industry structure, limits 
to modularity are aplenty, and constrain the convergence of  technical, organizational and 
market modularity. 
 
3. Limits to Modularity (1) - Demanding Coordination Requirements 
That this is so should not be surprising. As Pavitt (1999:XX) has convincingly argued, 
activities that require complex knowledge pose very demanding coordination 
requirements. There are cognitive limits to the process of modularization. Based on 
Brusoni (2003) and Tokumaru (2003), it is possible to highlight important differences in 
the coordination requirements of  “project execution” (to design and produce an artefact, 
e.g. a chip) and of “technology development” (to produce the underlying knowledge 
bases).  
Baldwin and Clark (2000: chapter 3) correctly emphasize that modularity in design 
has created opportunities for vertical specialization (combining disintegration and 
geographic dispersion) in project execution. Their analysis however neglects the 
increased knowledge exchange that is necessary to develop design and manufacturing 
technologies. This, in turn, requires ex ante coordination through integration in 
technology development. Modular product design thus needs knowledge-integrating 
firms to coordinate specialized bodies of knowledge and increasingly distributed learning 
processes. It does not reduce the need for system integration. 
This argument runs counter to established wisdom. Arora, Gambardella and Rullani 
(1998) for instance argue that modularity can be applied to innovation as well as to 
manufacturing. ”This is because modularity allows for a separation of the innovation 
process in two main activities: The production of basic (standardised) modules, and their 
combination to produce variants of technologies or product designs that are better suited 
to the special needs of individual users or markets.” (ibid: 123). In this view, there is a 
clear-cut separation between specialized suppliers and system integrators, with 
interactions between these firms coordinated by the market. Each supplier, focusing on a 
specific innovation module, would be able to specialize in specific learning and 
innovative efforts, while the “combination of modules” will be performed by downstream 
firms or by the users themselves. This “modular” division of labor is made possible by 
the use of information technology (Arora, Gambardella and Rullani mention simulation 
software for design purposes) that allows to codify knowledge, and hence facilitates 
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control, because it creates alternative market-based coordination mechanisms. This is so 
because a modular architecture creates an ‘information structure’ that cannot be changed 
during the duration of the project, and hence can be used to coordinate decentralized 
design teams.  
But this argument fails to acknowledge that the reuse of knowledge to combine 
modules requires a broader knowledge base for systems integration. In other words, 
modular product design may well increase complexity and hence the need for system 
integration. Large global network flagships retain diversified technology bases precisely 
to cope with the demanding coordination requirements of disintegrated and 
geographically dispersed “technology development”. This is in line with the findings of 
Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt (1997) that large firms are more diversified in the 
technologies they master than the products that they make and that their technological 
diversity has been increasing while typically their product range has narrowed. 
There is no automatic link between adopting a modular product design strategy and 
the adoption of a modular organization. Such a direct link is even less likely between the 
use of a modular product design and the modularization of the firm’s  knowledge base 
(Brusoni, 2003: 5). In fact, it is necessary to push the argument one step further (Ernst, 
2004b). Network flagships that can serve as “system integrators” are required to 
coordinate multi-layered global networks of firms that interact to conceive, design and 
engineer an artefact. As explained above, this is especially the case for new, 
“interdependent” design architectures - their development requires flagships that possess 
the systems integration knowledge to evaluate how best to advance across the myriad 
possible combinations (Brusoni, 2003; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). 
Take again chip design (Ernst and Martin, 2004). By combining advanced process 
development, design IP and applications knowledge, global network flagships have been 
able to compete successfully against the “modularity” model, as represented by the 
collaboration between fabless design houses and foundries. This is certainly the case for 
integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) like Intel, Texas Instruments, and 
STMicroelectronics that have managed to develop “platform leadership” strategies. A 
combination of process technology, design IP and system applications knowledge have 
also helped system companies like IBM, Philips, Nokia, Samsung, LG and the leading 
Japanese electronics system companies. Even when they purchase semiconductors from 
specialized suppliers (whether from IDMs, like Intel or TI, or from fabless and chipless 
companies), these system companies make a strong effort to retain considerable internal 
expertise in SC process technology, fabrication, EDA tools, and design IP. They realize 
that, without in-house mastery of such capabilities, it would be difficult to retain systems 
knowledge - the latter being a necessary prerequisite for turning these assets into 
differentiating features of their products and services.  
Of critical importance for the flagships of global design networks is the ability to 
frame the problems  (architectures; components; performance features) to be addressed in 
specific, temporary design projects
11. As explained by Brusoni (2003), flagships need to 
be able to identify the crucial technological and organizational interdependencies, to 
                                                           
11 A project is defined as “basically a contract, or rather a bundle of contracts, that specificy the duties, 
responsibilities and rewards of the firms involved..” (Brusoni, 2003: 15). 
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do not deserve to be pursued further. They need to be able to identify, probe and freeze 
key interdependencies. For each specific project, i.e. the design of an embedded 
microcontroller for a mobile phone for Motorola, the network “provides a temporary 
administrative framework within which some form of hierarchical coordination replaces 
the market.” (Brusoni, 2003: 15).  
In short, modular product design may lead to vertical specialization in project 
execution, but it requires integration in technology development. Ownership of tangible 
assets is not a sufficient condition for the effective coordination of multi-layered global 
design networks. Equally important are network flagships that can serve as “system 
integrators”. 
 
4. Limits to Modularity (2) - Constraints to Interface Standardization 
A surprising feature of modular systems is their considerable rigidity. Once deployed, 
interface standards are difficult to adjust. When the architectural yield achieved from a 
given relationship of components approaches its limit, it becomes necessary to establish a 
new architecture. But a defining characteristic of modular systems is that any transition to 
a new generation of design architecture requires fundamental changes in system 
components, which consequently will break down established interface standards 
(Chesbrough, 2003b).  
Take the afore-mentioned transformation of chip design, where a re-coupling of 
design and chip fabrication requires fundamental changes in design methodology. The 
result is that established interface standards cease to function, even for the most 
profoundly documented design rules that link fabricators (the silicon foundries) and 
design houses (Ernst, 2004b). Another example is the transition from 8-bit to 16-bit 
microprocessors that required massive changes in complementary software and hardware, 
and hence necessitated a redefinition of interface standards (Chesbrough, 2003b: 180, 
181).  
Sabel and Zeitlin (2004: 2m) demonstrate that it is impossible to establish “…standard 
design interfaces so comprehensive and stable that customers and suppliers can in effect 
interact as if operating in spot markets for complex components or subassemblies without 
jeopardizing their long-term survival.” In line with Pavitt (1999), they argue that 
innovation creates “unpredictable novelty”, requiring continuous relearning. Hence, 
“modularization, at least in the form of entrenched standards, cannot be.” (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2004: 5 m).  
Chip design provides an important example of the tight limits to interface 
standardization. Based on standard interfaces and design rules, the division of labor used 
to be reasonably simple during much of the 1990s. The resulting separation of chip 
design and fabrication has been one of the favorite example of modularization 
proponents. Engineers designed chips and handed the definition to the mask makers, who 
then sent the masks to the wafer manufacturers (the silicon foundries). And (most of the 
time, at least) the result of having this modular division of labor was a chip that could be 
manufactured at an acceptable yield.  
But this easy phase of modularization of the semiconductor industry has vanished for 
good (Ernst, 2004b; Ernst and Martin, 2004). As process technology has dramatically 
increased in complexity, intense interactions are required across all stages of the 
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interfaces and design rules. All participants in the semiconductor industry know that they 
need to find a way to organize collective and integrated solutions. They also know that 
uncertainty makes this extremely difficult, as does the fact that the industry is now 
vertically specialized. 
Current attempts to develop a “Unified Data Model”(UDM) provide an excellent 
example of the limits to interface standardization in the semiconductor industry. UDM  is 
a data base of chip definitions that encapsulates the information required for chip design, 
mask making and wafer manufacturing and that can function as a single data 
representation for a wide range of “electronic design automation” (EDA) tools. It is 
expected that UDM will enable designers to simulate a manufacturing run for different 
variations of a chip design and then address trade-offs between functionality, density and 
yield. Equally important benefits are expected to accrue to mask makers and wafer 
fabricators
12.  
While potential benefits are substantial, two fundamental constraints are currently 
blocking the development of UDM: intense competition among oligopolists; and 
uncertainty that results from growing complexity. First, intense competition among 
oligopolists prevents companies from agreeing on a common standard. To understand 
why, let us first look at earlier attempts to develop common data formats for EDA tools. 
Conditions seemed to be favorable. There were strong pressures to move forward, as 
design engineers needed common data formats for EDA to collaborate more effectively. 
In addition, process and design technologies were relatively mature, enabling modular 
design architectures. Nevertheless, developing a common data base was not possible. 
Reflecting the oligopolistic market structure of the EDA industry, two competing data 
formats for EDA tools have emerged: “Open Access”, led by Cadence, and supported by 
IBM, and “Milkyway”, led by Synposis. 
Developing UDM may be even more difficult. Fundamental implementation barriers 
indicate persistent limits to modularity. These limits  result from a powerful combination 
of rising complexity due to a shift to a new, interdependent design architecture (SoC) and 
intense oligopolistic competition. As for the latter, current attempts to develop the UDM 
standard are based on the “Open Access” standard, which means that Cadence as well as 
IBM would greatly benefit  if UDM would materialize. It is thus hardly surprising that 
both these companies are strong supporters of the UDM standard, while both Synposis 
and Mentor remain hostile
13.  
But more important are complexity-related constraints that drastically  increase   
uncertainty, obstructing the development of entrenched standards. Increasing complexity 
results from changes in design architecture as well as from advanced process geometry 
that pushes the limits of semiconductor fabrication. To cope with increasing complexity 
requires dense interactions between IC design and fabrication, and these interactions 
must occur simultaneously at multiple levels. In contrast to the earlier separation of 
                                                           
12 Main carriers of UDM include the Silicon Integration Initiative Inc.  (SI2), an organization of industry-
leading semiconductor manufacturers, electronic system companies, design houses and EDA tool vendors, 
with the mandate to improve the productivity of integrated circuit manufacturing and design. This industry 
organization has started to incorporate work from the “Design to Mask Coalition”(DTMC) to extend the 
“Open Access” standard for EDA tools ( see below) with UDM-like features. 
13 Cadence actually provided the Open Access original code to the SI2 organization 
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direction, to a more integrated model.  
Design teams now must share data and exchange knowledge with mask makers and 
wafer fabricators (foundries). For instance, mask makers must have access to design data 
so that they can make quick changes in their techniques (such as for recticle 
enhancement), which gets increasingly tricky as component size shrinks. However, 
today’s chip design methodologies do not provide mask manufacturers with the data they 
need. As a result, mask makers “…often waste time tuning circuits inappropriately or, 
worse, tuning layout features that aren’t even part of the actual circuitry…. There’s 
always the danger that the tweaking that takes place during mask making may result in 
accidental changes to the performance of chip circuits, necessitating expensive design 
iterations. “ (James, 2004: 2).Design rules are also no longer capable of coordinating the 
interface between design and fabrication. With growing miniaturization, design rules 
become geometrically more complex and interdependent. The chief technical officer of a 
major photomask producer worries that “… at 65nm, designers may end up with so many 
rules that it will be impossible for a mere mortal (even a design engineer) to cope with all 
of them.” (quoted in James, 2004: 2).  
All of this indicates very tight constraints to interface standardization. “We simply 
don’t have enough science to understand how to create a data format that would work in 
all these different environments.” (Joe Sawicki, VP of the design-to-silicon group at 
Mentor, as quoted in James, G., 2004: 3). Other observers go even further, and argue that 
a common interface standard is logically impossible, as “… the tasks and tools in 
different (design) phases need to see data very differently to be effective…(Hence), 
(e)ach tool requires a data model that is specific to the task.” (Richard Goldman, VP of 
strategic market development at Synopsis, as quoted in James, 2004: 3). An additional 
modularity constraint is built-in obsolescence, a concern voiced especially by IP 
providers. In this view, common standard interfaces are much too rigid to cope with 
frequent adjustments in chip manufacturing processes which are commonplace at the sub-
micron level. 
Our analysis of constraints to interface standardization in chip design confirms 
Chesbrough’s dynamic theory of modularity (see 2.3. of this paper). These constraints 
result from the transition to new and immature architectures and process technologies. I 
part however company with Chesbrough’s analysis, in emphasizing that these limits to 
modularity will not necessarily lead to  a pendulum-like swing back to the status quo 
ante of vertical integration. Instead, as demonstrated in Ernst and Martin (2004), new 
hybrid forms of industrial organization that mix and match elements of modularity and 
integration, are likely to emerge. These hybrid organizational responses reflect the simple 
fact that firms need to cope with highly complex technical and competitive challenges for 
which no ready-made organizational solutions exist. 
Take design rules. With increasing complexity, they need to treat a fine balance. 
Design rules need to be “enabling, i.e. firm enough to encourage modular innovation and 
recombination – but loose enough not to be constraining to the evolution of the system.” 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004: 5,6 m). This is why inter-firm collaboration increasingly relies 
on emerging methodologies and practices of iterated co-design, such as concurrent 
engineering, bench-marking, co-location of personnel, problem-solving teams, and 
processual quality standards. This forces “collaborators to question and clarify their 
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within and across firm boundaries (, DE: and national borders) in ways that fixed 
modular interfaces do not.” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004: 2 m). 
The only thing certain is that, with rising complexity, designers, mask makers and 
wafer fabricators must move beyond the “modular” design network. They must find new 
and unconventional ways to work together “collaboratively” as part of more integrated 
global design networks. For this to happen, however, all three actors will need a shared 
data model, so redesigns that are mandated during fabrication will not force the designers 
to start again from scratch. But developing such a common data base for interdependent 
design architectures is extremely difficult. 
Whether these limits to modularity can be overcome, depends in the end on 
competitive dynamics. There might be forces that can break the limits of oligopolistic 
rivalry.  For instance, a leading foundry (e.g. TSMC) or integrated deveice manufacturer 
(IDM) could impose a solution by forcing the rest of the industry to use whatever UDM 
definition would work well in its factories. But this would force the foundry or IDM to 
reveal more about its own internal data representations than it might normally want to do. 
Alternatively, a “customer “revolt” by the chip design community may help to break the 
stalemate: “… at some point, EDA users will probably… refuse to buy additional tools 
until they get the interoperability that’s necessary to preserve their cost structure.” 
(James, 2004: 5). 
 
5. Limits to Modularity (3) - A Slow-Down of Innovation 
This paper has highlighted inherent rigidities of pure-play market modularity. There 
are thus strong reasons to belief that market modularity, without corrective moves 
towards organizational integration, may slow down the pace of innovation. First, as 
demonstrated by Chesbrough (2003b: 180), modular systems are hard to advance. “While 
component innovation within the system can continue to occur  so long as the boundaries 
of the components’ relation with the rest of the system are respected, innovation at the 
system level becomes increasingly problematic…. Thus, the very partitioning of the 
system that enabled market modularity to develop, later turns into a restriction upon that 
system’s further evolution.”  
Second, advances in modularity may reduce the rents that firms can capture from 
innovation. In industries like hard disk drives (HDDs), PCs and consumer electronics, 
high modularity apparently has led to a loss of system integration capabilities. As for 
HDDs, during phase I1, “IBM profited not only from its use of a more advanced 
component, it profited as well from its ability to manage the interactions of the advanced 
component with the rest of the system.” (Chesbrough, 2003b: 191). But once the industry 
moved to phase M1, IBM was no longer able to reap rents from defining the systems 
architecture (through closed proprietary standards)
14.  
But there is also a third reason why modularity may slow down the pace of innovation. 
Even if flagships retain extensive systems integration capabilities and market power, they 
may find it difficult to advance architectures (“lead platforms”) in an industry, precisely 
                                                           
14 I would argue however that this is not the end of the story, and that one should not restrict the analysis to 
a single product market. Once IBM understood that its rent generation capability for HDD was declining, it 
began to diversify into other areas, especially IT services. This explains why IBM eventually sold its HDD 
operations to Hitachi. 
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faced by Intel in its attempt to promote its “platform leadership” strategies (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002: 39-76). These strategies are defined by decisions on the “system 
architecture (the degree of modularity), interfaces (the degree of openness of the 
interfaces to the platform), and intellectual property (how much information about the 
platform and its interfaces to disclose to outside firms)” (ibid: 40). To build a coalition of 
complementors to its platform, Intel must shoulder the substantial costs and risks 
involved in making new products that complement the new architecture. 
  This gives rise to an important strategic dilemma that has been widely emphasized in 
the revisionist literature. As modularity is not the stable end state of industry evolution, 
firms must retain their system-level knowledge. It is again Chesbrough (2003b) who 
pushes this analysis one step further. He asks how firms can develop their system-level 
knowledge in a modular world, when they must compete against firms that pursue highly 
focused business strategies, and thus do not incur the cost of developing and maintaining 
the systems-level knowledge? In his words, “(o)nce the advance of modularity has 
obliterated the rents from architectural knowledge, there is a real question of how a firm 
may sustain its systems integration capabilities in the absence of being able to profit from 
that knowledge.” (ibid: : 191). 
 
6. Responses 
Let us finally briefly examine the difficulties that management faces when it attempts 
to respond to the limits to modularity described in this paper. A useful analytical device 
is the concept of “iterated co-design”,  introduced by Sabel and Zeitlin (2004). Defined as 
adjustments in organization, work routines and location that allow for formalized but 
flexible inter-firm collaboration within global networks, this concept is particularly 
helpful to understand implications for the organization and strategies of engineering and 
design networks. 
A basic characteristic of  “iterated co-design” arrangements is that “suppliers 
contribute to the redefinition of interface specifications for new products based on their 
experience in manufacturing existing models.” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004: 12). As a 
decentralized process of concurrent engineering, “iterated co-design” has been pioneered 
in the car industry. But, as research on global design networks in the electronics industry 
shows, SoC design methodologies are following similar principles (Ernst, 2004b). 
Iterated co-design has two objectives: to cope with uncertainty that incumbent market 
leaders face through disruptive technologies, as defined in Christensen (1997); and to 
shape and adjust the multiple interfaces among disintegrated and geographically 
dispersed design teams that are contributing to a modular design project.  
“Disruptive technologies” are a serious challenge for incumbent market leaders, 
precisely because they begin to realize their potential in lower-end and initially 
peripheral markets, and because they are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, 
frequently, more convenient to use. (Christensen, 1997: XV) Christensen provides three 
reasons why incumbents fail to notice “lower-end” markets that may erode their market 
leadership: i) Because these technologies are simpler and cheaper, they promise lower 
margins, not greater profits: “It is very difficult for a company whose cost structure is 
tailored to compete in high-end markets to be profitable in low-end markets as well” 
(Christensen, 1997, p.XX). ii) Disruptive technologies are first commercialized in 
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address. And iii) The incumbents’ most profitable customers generally do not want, and 
initially cannot use products based on disruptive technologies.  
“Disruptive technologies” are ubiquitous, because, in principle, all established 
technologies are disruptible. This explains why “modularization, by entrenching deep 
assumptions about the design of products or product classes, is a self-limiting strategy.” 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004:8). With high uncertainty about changes in technology and 
markets, stabilization of technical interface standards is a two-edged sword. “Some 
standardization is obviously necessary to allow specialists to focus on the complex 
subsystems in which they have distinctive capabilities. But too much standardization can 
just as obviously become a barrier to systematic innovation and lock component 
manufacturers into a potentially obsolete product architecture.” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004: 
9).This explains why firms, especially in fast-moving industries like electronics, are 
reluctant to commit to a single product architecture and to a single set of  technical 
interface standards, hence constraining the development of market modularity. 
Of equal importance however is the second objective of “iterated co-design”, i.e. to 
coordinate the multiple interfaces that reflect the growing complexity of SoC design. An 
interface is created when information must flow, and when knowledge must be 
exchanged, “…between groups that are isolated from each other, whether by goals, 
methodologies, geography or culture” (Wilson, 2003: 49). This is exactly what is 
happening with SoC design. The diversity of functions that must be integrated into the 
chip means that “various blocks within the finished design will have come from different 
groups, some within and some outside the design team. Some of these groups …may not 
share a vocabulary, or even a language and culture with the primary chip design group.” 
(Wilson, 2003:48). A typical SoC design team needs to manage at least six main types of 
design interfaces (Ernst, 2004b): with system designers, with providers of design 
building-blocks (the so-called silicon intellectual property, SIP), with software 
developers, with verification teams, with EDA tool vendors, as well as with foundry 
services (fabrication).  
In addition, these different design network communities are spread across the ten 
strategic groups of firms and research institutes that participate in GDNs, that I have 
described in note 3 of this paper. Managing these multiple design interfaces poses 
extremely demanding coordination requirements. For instance, each of the different 
design network communities insists on using their own language and tools. Typically, in 
SoC design teams, there are “islands of automation” of different design tasks, each based 
on a different language. “Nobody will easily give up the language or the approach used 
for their own particular task for the sake of the overall flow” (Pierre Bricaud, design 
manager at Mentor Graphics, quoted in “SoC designers describe their ‘best practices’”, 
2002).  
This poses a serious challenge to modular design organization. As design teams 
become larger and separated by distance or design disciplines, they need to be able to 
communicate with each other. While they share a common objective, they use highly 
dissimilar vocabularies. Defining interfaces requires shared definitions of the data that 
need to be exchanged, of the formats and protocols that govern data transfer and 
interpretation, and of the economic performance requirements of the designs. Developing 
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Equally important, data must be translated into a form usable by different design groups.  
“Iterated co-design” is an attempt to cope with these difficulties, by rendering tacit 
knowledge at least partly explicit. But this requires a profound capacity for systems 
integration in order to coordinate the multiple interfaces between. Equally important is a 
capacity for close monitoring of interactions, in order “to detect performance failures and 
deception before they lead to disastrous consequences” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004: 13). To 
understand the challenges for “iterated co-design”, let us look at two illustrative 
examples of design interface management within GDNs: interfaces of the core SoC 
design team with system designers, and interfaces with foundry services. 
By definition, SoC design requires close interaction with system designers, marketing 
people and end customers ( the “set makers”). With product life cycles often as short as 
six months or less, system design requirements keep changing rapidly. The protocol 
necessary to transmit these changes real-time to all the different design network 
participants is “one of the great unsolved problems of design management”. (Wilson, 
2003: 56). Communication is also fraught with problems between hardware and software 
designers: “Verilog representation of a block by hardware designers, for example, may 
need to be translated into …. a Java transaction-level model of the block for use by 
software designers.” (Wilson, 2003: 52). The amount of work required for this translation 
is enormous, so much depends on the availability of new software tools that would make 
a progressive automation possible. 
Interactions with foundry services are arguably the most explicitly recognized 
interfaces in the entire SoC flow, with well documented and automatically checkable 
“design rules” (Macher, Mowery and Simcoe, 2002). Yet, with growing complexity of 
SoC design, the management of the foundry interface also poses new challenges. A 
combination of new processes and drastic changes in design methodology implies that 
design rules need to be tweaked and stretched, and that process limitations are there “to 
be explored not worshipped” (Wilson, 2003: 63), requiring a much closer interaction 
between designers and process engineers. From the perspective of foundries, for instance, 
sub-micron process technology makes yield enhancement much more difficult for 20 to 
50 million transistor SoCs (author’s interview with Taiwanese foundry, September 22, 
2003).  
As processes grow more demanding, mask makers and process engineers will try to 
pass this growing complexity to the chip design team through an enormous increase in 
complexity in either cell selection or design rules. For instance, a leading-edge SoC 
design is likely to require 22 separate cells. And the foundry’s process engineers now 
include into the design rules for SoC designers the request to “design-for-yield-
enhancement.”  
This new interface requirement with fabrication means that design teams must adjust 
the design to improve the odds that the process will yield well and that the dice will 
continue working even under demanding system performance requirements. In other 
words, designers must take into account the effects of fabrication process variations, 
which makes design even more complex. There is now a much greater need for dense 
interaction between physical designers and process integration teams, even for relatively 
stable designs. Designers increasingly must take into account the intricacies of process 
development. An “extraordinary degree of coordination” is required between SoC 
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seen as a community effort”, 2003).  
In short, chip design has become itself a highly complex technology system, where 
multiple communication and knowledge exchange  interfaces must be managed 
simultaneously. Obviously, the idea of translating technical modularity into 
organizational modularity through vertical specialization has many attractions. Yet, its 
implementation requires a mind-boggling degree of cooperation among the diverse 
participants of design networks. We have seen that this is true for all the different design 
interfaces. Ironically, the more chip design becomes modularized through SoC 
methodologies, and the more it moves into sub-micron territory, the more current 
transformations appear to move in the opposite direction to more integrated forms of 
industrial organization. Yet this does not imply a return to the status quo ante of vertical 
integration. Instead, new hybrid forms of industrial organization are likely to emerge, as 
firms need to cope with increasingly complex technical and competitive challenges (as 
explored in Ernst and Martin, 2004). 
 
Conclusions 
To conclude, it is time to revisit earlier debates on modularity in order to improve the 
theoretical and empirical validity of that concept. Progress in the division of labor in 
design (technical modularity) has obviously created ample opportunities for the 
organization of firms beyond vertical integration. It may also transform industry structure 
and markets, by fostering vertical specialization in both manufacturing and knowledge 
production. But there is nothing automatic about this process. That we do not find a 
“natural” convergence of technical, organizational and market modularity has its root 
cause in three fundamental limits to modularity that the paper has explored in detail, 
drawing on evidence from chip design: demanding coordination requirements, especially 
for technology development; constraints to interface standardization; and a slow-down of 
innovation that may result from too strict an adherence to market and organizational 
modularity.  
Drawing on a revisionist literature that has emerged over the last few years, the paper 
has highlighted three specific weaknesses of current theories of modularity: they 
confound technical with market modularity; they exaggerate the empirical significance of 
market modularity; and they fail to explore the dynamics of modularization. The paper 
argues that these weaknesses must be addressed, if we want to capture the complex forces 
and constraints that link technical modularity with changes in organization and market 
structure. 
All of this strongly suggests that we need to counter  whatever tendency exists in the 
“modularity” literature to generalize empirical observations that are context-specific and 
to confound them with prescription as well as prediction. It is certainly not possible to 
sustain the claim that modularity is the stable end state of industry evolution, and that this 
is true across industries and technologies. While modular design has acted as a powerful 
catalyst for changes in business organization and industry structure, limits to modularity 
are aplenty, and constrain the convergence of  technical, organizational and market 
modularity. 
To conclude, these findings add an important qualification to a widely accepted 
proposition that, as relevant knowledge can now be codified in frameworks and 
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lowering the transaction cost of technological knowledge (e.g., Arora  and Gambardella, 
1994). As Tokumaru (2004: 3) observes, this concept of “knowledge” comes very close 
to Arrow’s (1962) concept of context-independent information that can be easily 
transmitted. By reducing learning to information processing, that proposition neglects the 
increasing complexity of technological knowledge that accompanies the process of 
codification, as this paper demonstrates for chip design. 
The paper also adds a second important qualification to the study of 
internationalization of innovation. I emphasize that vertical specialization does not imply 
that the “Visible Hand” of large global corporations will become invisible, giving rise to 
a resurgence of market forces. In line with Pavitt (2003a and 2003 b), Chesbrough (2003a 
and 2003b), Brusoni (2003), Tokumaru (2004) , and Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001), 
this paper introduces a counter-proposition: if  codification does not reduce complexity 
(which it fails to do in chip design), then the division of innovative labor will remain 
constrained, and requires more (not less) coordination through system integrators or 
network flagships.  
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